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Guaranteed  employment  can be  valuable  insurance  against
poverty. But the recent experience in Maharashtra suggests that
raising the wage rate when you don't have the budget to pay for
it is not in the interests of all the poor. Some get higher pay, but
others must go without relief work.
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Relief work schemes provide well-targeted relief  increase in wage rates. This partly reflected
to poor people, and valuable insurance against  good monsoons but, controlling for monsoons,
poverty.  But their success may depend on the  tlhere  are signs that falling employment reflected
scheme's design - particularly the wage rate  rationing; some poor people who wanted relief
and coverage offered.  work could not get it.
The most famous and one of the most  Ravallion, Datt, and Chaudhuri found that
successful of these programs is the Employment  EGS met less than half of the demand for work
Guarantee Scheme (EGS) that has been in  after the wage increase and that almost all of the
operation since the mid-1970s in the Indian state  fall in EGS employment was from rationing.
of Maharashtra.  In a typical year it provides  The effects of the initial wage increase on the
about 100 million person-days of unskilled  poor are ambiguous: some could get higher
employment on rural infrastructure projects, at an  wages but others went without desired relief
average cost of about one dollar a day in the late  work.
1980s. The demand for EGS work fluctuates
enormously from year to year (depen(iinig  on the  The concept ol assured employment, albeit
vagaries of the monsoon) and across seasons in a  at a low wage, can be attractive in terms of
given year.  poverty alleviation:  it generally allows scarce
resources to go to the poorest first (at least those
In mid-1988 the piece rates paid to workers  able to work), it maximizes the insurance
on EGS doubled, in line with new statutory  benefits to the poor, and it helps undermine some
minimum wage rates for agricultural labor.  of the possibilities for corruption on such
Ravallion, Datt, and Chaudhuri investigated the  schemes - and for exploitation in labor markets
effects of this sudden increase on the scheme's  and tenancy contract.s.
cost, the workers' wages, and their ability to find
work when needed.  But acaieving these beneflts with limited
budgetary resources requires a low enough wage
They found that the impact of tlhe  wage  rate. The recent experience in Maharashtra
increase on real cost was dampened by inflation,  suggcsLs  that imposing a higher wage rate when
adjustments in the composition of work, and,  you don't  have the budget to pay for it is not in
most important, by falling employment. The  the interests of all of the poor.
aggregate real cost per month fell after the
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Amongst  developing  countries,  the  "Employment  Guarantee  Scheme"  (ECS)  in
the  state  of Maharashtra  in India  is  probably  the  most famous  and,  by many
accounts,  the  most successful  direct  governmental  effort  at reducing  absolute
poverty  in rural  areas. 1 Since  the  mid-197Us,  EGS  has aimed  to offer
unskilled  rural  employment  on demand,  as  embodied  in its  slogan,  "magel  tyala
kam" ("whoever  desires  work  will get  it"). The  work  creates  or  maintains
rural  infrastructure,  through  small  scale  irrigation  and soil  conservation
projects,  re-forestation,  and  rural  road  building. EGS  projects  are  designed
to  be highly  incensive  in their  use  of un-skilled  labor,  which  typically
accounts  for  over two-thirds  of variable  costs. Wages  are  set  in the  form  of
piece  rates,  stipulating  rates  of pay for  a large  number  of specific  tasks,
such  as digging,  breaking  rocks,  shifting  earth,  and transplanting.
The  scale  of the  scheme  is impressive;  in  a typical  year,  it  provides
about  100  million  person-days  of employment. (The  state's  aggregate  rural
workforce  - including  cultivators  - was  about  20 million  persons  in the  mid-
1980s.) Given  this  scale,  it is surprising  how little  we seem  to  know about
the  scheme's  performance  in  alleviating  income  poverty. But the  little  we do
know suggests  that  the  scheme  is  well  targeted,  in  that the  non-poor  are
rarely  attracted,  and that  the  net  transfer  and income  stabilization  benefits
to the  poor  are likely  to  be quite  sizable.2
To  many observers,  the  "employment  guarantee"  built into  the  Maharashtra
scheme  has  been an important  factor  in realizing  those  benefits. With
adequate  (th-ugh  still  limited)  budgetary  resources,  the  combination  of an
employment  guarante.  and  a  wage rate  low  enough  to  balance  the  budget  in an
average  year is likely  to  be the  policy  which  will  have the  greatest  impact  on2
measures  of poverty  which  give  highest  weight  to the  poorest  (Basu,  1981;
Ravallion,  1990a).3
Until  recently,  the  piece  rates  have  been such  that  a typical  EGS  worker
could  earn  wages  roughly  on  par  with  prevailing  agricultural  wages.  However,
in  May 1988  the  piece  rates  paid  by the  EGS  doubled,  following  a doubling  in
statutory  minimum  wage rates. Serious  concerns  have  been expressed  about  the
budgetary  consequences  of this  substantial  increase  in the  EGS  wage (Subbarao,
1989;  World  Bank,  1989). The  potential  impact  on cost  would  naturally  create
pressure  to relax  the  employment  "guarantee".  Providing  higher  wages  without
the  guarantee  will  mean that,  although  the  actual  participants  are  made better
off, fewer  of the  poor  will  be able to  become  participants.  High  wages  rates
(relative  to  prevailing  rates  in agriculture)  throw  into  doubt  both the  fiscal
sustainability  and  the  social  desirability  of an  employment  guarantee
(Ravallion,  1990b).
The  existing  evidence  on effects  of the  wage increase  is inconclusive.
Some  observers  have suggested  that  an  unfulfilled  demand  for  EGS  work  by the
poor  emerged. There  were reports  of un-seasonal  migration  into  urban  areas  of
Maharashtra  in 1988/89,  attributed  to  problems  in finding  EGS  work in rural
areas.4 Average  attendances  on EGS  did fall  after  mid-1988. However,  the
crop-years  following  the  wage increase  were  amongst  the  best in recent  times,
and this  may  equally  well  explain  the  falling  attendances. During  May 1990,
the first  two  authors  raised  the  issue  in  a few  informal  interviews  with
administrators  and  workers  on EGS,  and  other  interested  parties. There  was  no
obvious  sign  of a consensus  on  how the  wage increase  affected  the  scheme;
"good  monsoons  since  then"  was  easily  as popular  an explanation  as "EGS  work
unavailable".3
This  paper  investigates  the  effects  on the  scheme  of the  dramatic  change
in the  EGS  wage  schedule  in  mid-1988. Three  questions  are  addressed:
i) What happened  to  EGS  employment,  wage rates,  and  the  cost  of the
scheme  to the  government  after  the  increase  in the  statutory  minimum  wage
rate?  Section  2  describes  how the  main  variables  of interest  have evolved.
ii) What determines  EGS  employment,  and  did  this  change  as a result  of
the  wage increase? Section  3 examines  this  question  using  an econometric
model  of the  monthly  actendance  count  on EGS  from  1975  to 1988. An estimatc
is  then  made  of the  extent  of  work rationing  on EGS  during  the  12  months  after
the  wage increase.
ii)  Does the  EGS  now  "guarantee"  employmant,  in the  sense  that  workars
can  find  local  employment  when they  want it,  at the  going  EGS  wages? We
address  this  question  using  new  data  on the  scheme  for  1987/90  in Section  4.
2.  Maharashtra's  "Employment  Guarantee  3cheme"  Before  and  After  May 1988.
We shall  first  look  closely  at the  period  April  1987 to  February  1990,
for  which  we have monthly  data  on a  number  of key  variables. 5 This  will
motivate  our interest  in  the  more analytical  questions  addressed  in sections  3
and  4.
One  can  usefully  divide  the  period  into  three  sub-periods: Sub-period
1: Pre-May  1988,  during  which  the  average  wage  rate  on EGS  was approximately
eaual  to the  agricultural  wage rate. Sub-Deriod  2: June  i988 to  November
1988,  during  which  there  were some  significant  adjustments  in the  scheme,  as
will  be discussed  below. Sub-period  3: The  period  since  December  1988  in
which,  we shall  argue,  the  scheme  appears  to have  settled  into  a new
"equilibrium".  The three  sub-periods  are identified  in Figure  1,  which  plots4
the  averagt.  real  wage rate  for  EGS  employees  over  the  period  April 1987  to
February  1990,  as  well as our  estimate  of the  average  wage rate  for
agriculture,  which  we will discuss  further  in  section  4.
The  adjustment  period  saw  the  EGS  wage roughly  double  initially,  in line
with the  increase  in the  statutory  minimum  wiage  rate. The  wage rate then  fell
almost  as  dramatically,  to end  up at about  one third  higher  (in  real  terms)
than  it  had  been  prior  to  May 1988 (Figure  1).
Inflation  contributed  to this  decline,  but there  are  other  factors  to
consider. Wage rates  on the  EGS  are fixed  according  to the type  of  w?ork  done
and its  output;  for  example,  rock  breaking  is  paid  at a different  rate  per
cubic  foot  to loading  soil  on trucks. The  whole  piece  rate schedule  doubled
after  May 1988. The  allocation  of the  available  work across  these  activities
- which  we will  refer  to as the  composition  of EGS  work - is  determined  by the
EGS  authorities,  through  their  project  choices. Under  such  conditions  it  may
be quite  sensible  for  the  authorities  to adjust  the  latter  in favor  of
activities  with lower  piece  rates,  in  response  to the  increase  in  the  wage
schedule.6
Given  that  such  adjustments  are  not instantaneous,  a  better  indication
of how the scheme responded to the change in wage schedule can be obtained by
comparing outcomes across periods 1 and 3.  Table 1 gives some data of
interest for all three sub-periods, calculated from unpublished monthly EGS
records.
By the third sub-period, the impact of doubling the piece rate schedule
amounted to about a one-third increase in the average real EGS wage rate;
roughly two-thirds of the initial wage increase  was absorbed through inflation
and changes in work composition.  But the more striking observation is that,5
despite  the  net  teal  wage increase,  empluyitcnt  actually  fell,  and  by a similar
proportion  to  the increase  in the  average  wage.7  Comparing  sub-periods  1 and
3,  unit  non-wage  cost  remained  fairly  constant  in real  terms. On balance,  the
average  real  monthly  cost  of running  the  scheme  fell  by about  one-fifth  after
the  doubling  of piece  rates  in  May  1988.
A decomposition  formula  can  be used to  throw  further  light  on the
relative  importance  of these  various  factors  - wage rates,  non-wage  costs,  and
employment  - in  determining  the  scheme's  operating  cost.  Let  Ct denote  the
total  operating  cost  of EGS in  month  t,  which  can  be written  as Ct
- VtLt  where  Vt is  unit  real  cost  per  worker  and  Lt is the  number  of workers
employed in  month t.  Unit cost can be written as Vt - Wt + Xt where Wt
denotes  average  real  wage  cost  per  worker  and  Xt denotes  average  real  non-
wage  cost.  The  value  of  Wt depends  on the  current  purchasing  power  of the
stipulated  nominal  piece  rate  schedule,  and  on the  allocation  of available
w3rk across  the  various  piece  rate  categories  at date  t.  The  pi"--e  rate
schedule  is tied  to  the  statutory  minimum  wage rate  for  agricultural  labor,  mt
(in  nominal  units),  for  some  pre-determined  allocation  of  work across  piece
rate  categcries. If that  is  also the  allocation  at date  t then  Wt - mt/pt
where  Pt denotes  the  price  deflator  for  date  t.  More generally  Wt - ktmt/pt,
and  a change  in  k  will  be referred  as a change  in "work  composition"  (relative
to the  date  when the  piece  rate  schedule  was fixed). We consider  two  dates  t
- 1 (sub-period 1) and t - 3 (sub-period 3), and we know that m3 - 2ml.  The
change  in  monthly  operating  cost  between  sub-period  1 and  3 and its
decomposition  is then  given  in  Table  2.
Both  inflation  and (more  importantly)  the  change  in  work composition
were important  in  holding  down  real  costs  after  the  increase  in the  minimum6
wage.  However,  the  overwhelming  term  in  the  decomposition  is the  cost  saving
due to the  decrease  in employment;  if  nothing  else  had  changed,  the  saving  Clue
to the drop in employment would have eliminated about 60% of the initial
impact of the doubling of the minimum wage rate (Table 2).  Following sections
will try to better understand this fall in employment.
3.  Did the Process of Employment Determination Change Significantly?
We shall now look as far back into the history of the scheme as data
permit, to better understand the determinants of employment.  Section 3.1
presents a model of EGS attendances prior to mid-1988, which section 3.2 will
use to perform statistical tests for drift in EGS employment after the wage
increase.  Section 3.3 will use the  model to estimate the extent of employment
rationing in the 12 months following the wage increase.
3.1  A Model of Monthly Attendances on the EGS. 1975-1988
The data on monthly person-days of employment on EGS used in the
previous section are only available since April 1987.  We need to go much
further back in time to convincingly test for a structural change in the model
determining employment after mid-1988.  Fortunately, while a long time series
of employment in person-days is not available, the Government of Maharashtra
has kept a regular attendance count at EGS project sites since July 1975.  And
this is probably a good proxy for employment. 8
We assume that monthly EGS attendances are determined by the current EGS
wage rate, foodgrain output in the current year, the level and pattern of
rainfall, seasonal dummy variables, and a time trend, in_luded to allow for
any time dependent omitted variables.  We shall also allow the possitility7
thdt  EGS  attendances  in a given  month  do not  adjusW  instantaneously  to the
current  values  of these  var.ables. Serial  correlation  in attendances  can
arise  in  a number  of  ways.  For  example,  changes  in a6 sicultural output  may
have lagged  effects  on income  of the  poor  and,  hence,  their  demand  for  relief
work.  Under  certain  conditions  (notably  that  the  lags  can  be smoothed
exponentially),  simply  adding  lagged  attendances  to the  model  will adequately
capture  such  lagged  effects  of the  explanatory  variables. The fortnightly
payment  period  used  by the  EGS  may  also  generate  some "stickiness"  in the
adjustment  of employment  to changing  conditions. It  can  also  be conjectured
that  the  attendance  count  will tend  to  be more  serially  correlated  than
person-days  of employment.
Labor  attendance  data  are  available  on a monthly  basis  for  the  14-year
period  spanning  July 1975  through  June 1989.9 However,  only  annual  data on
the  EGS time  wage are  available  for  this  period;  the  time  wage is  measured  as
the  average  wage  per  person  day for  the  EGS  financial  year  April  through
March. Thus  we have  had to  use the  same  value  of the  wage variable  for  the
months  April through  March. lhe  nominal  wcnge  rates  were deflated  by the
Consumer  Price  Irlex  for  Agricultural  Laborers  '  r  Maharashtra  to obtain  real
EGS  wages  at 1975/76  prices.
Data  on output  of foodgrains  pertain  to the  agriculturai  year  July to
June,10  and (as  for  the  EGS  real  wage)  the  foodgrain  output  variable  takes  on
the  same  value  over these  months. Foodgrain  output  is  of course  observed  only
at the  end  of the  agricultural  year,  and  it  may appear  odd  to use it  to
explain  EGS  attendances  for  the  earlier  months  (of  the  agricultural  year).
However,  it seems  plausible  that,  insofar  as EGS  attendances  in the  earlier
months  depend  on the  level  of agricultural  activity  in those  months,  the8
conditions  determining  the  latter  (e.g.  adequate  and timely  rainfall  in the
monsoon  period)  would  also  be reflected  in the  agricultural  output  for  the
entire  year. 11
Monthly  data  on rainfall  for  four  meteorological  sub-divisions  in
Maharashtra  were  collated  from  various  issues  of the  Statistical  Abstract  of
India  and the  Agricultural  Situation  in  IndiA. Rainfall  for  Maharashtra  is
derived  as a weighted  average  of the  rainfall  in  the  four  sub-divisions,  the
weights  being  proportional  to  the  average  net  sown  areas  in  the  sub-divisions
during  1978/79  to 1980/81  (COM,  1984). The  effect  of rainfall  on monthly  EGS
labor  attendance,  although  potentially  significant,  need  not  be straight-
forward. The rainfall  effect  would  presumably  be seasonally  differentiated,
depending  on  whether  there  is deficit  or excess  rainfall,  and on the  amount  of
deficit  or excess. We thus  use  a fairly  flexible  approach  in introducing  the
rainfall  variables,  by defining  the  following  "rainfall  excess"  (RE)  and
"rainfali  deficit"  (RD)  variables:
REj  - Mj.DE.(R  - NR)/NR  j - 1,...12
RDj  - M.(1  - DE).(NR  - R)/NR  j - 1,...12
where  Mj is a dummy  variable  for  month  j, DE is  a dummy variable  for  excess
rainfall  (equals  one if there  is  excess  rain,  zero  otherwise),  R and  NR ar-
the  actual  and  normal  rainfall  respectively.  The  normal  rainfall  for  any
month  is  defined  as the  average  rainfall  for  that  month  over  the  entire  13-
year  period  1975/76  to  1988/89.
The  wage rate  in agriculture  is  probably  the  most important  omitted
variable  in  our  model. We considered  including  the  annual  agricultural  wage9
series  available  from  Agricultural  Wazs  in India  (AWI). However,  these  are
currently  only  available  up to 1986/7,  so if  we used that  data as an
independent  variable  in the  model  we would  have  missing  values  to  deal  with
for  the  last  two  years,  and  we would  have to forecast  the  series  for  1988/89,
prior  to forecasting  attendances.  This  creates  complications,  and  it is
probably  better  to give  our  model  a reduced  form  interpretation,  in which  an
equation  for  the  agricultural  wage  rate  has  been  "solved  out". Monthly
agricultural  wage  data for  Maharashtra  over  the last  few  years  ara  available
from  a different  source  (though  their  co.nparability  with  AWI data  is  unclear).
These  are  reported  in Figure  1 and  are  used in  section  4.  They do  no suggest
that  the  drop in  EGS  attendances  after  mid-1988  could  piausibly  be attributed
to an increase  in the  agricultural  wage rate,  which  remained  fairly  constant.
Our  later  inferences  based  on the  post-sample  forecasts  are  likely  to  be
robust  to the  omission  of agricultural  wages  from  our  cmdel.
Our  model  of EGS  labor  attendances  can  be written  as
11  12
Lt  - aO + QlLt-l  + 02Wt + a3Qt +  -- 4t  +  E  BjMjt - Z  (TjREjt  +  6jRDjt)  +  et  (1)
j-l  j1
where  Lt is  the  recorded  labor  attendance  on EGS  for  month  t,  Wt is the  real
EGS  wage rate  for the  year  including  month  t,  Qt is the  output  of foodgrains
for  that  crop  year,  Mjs are  the  monthly  dummy  variables  fcr  j-l,...11  (j-l
represents  July),  t  is  a time  trend,  REj  and  RDj  are the  month-specific  excess
and  deficit  rainfall  variables  (as  defined  above)  respectively  for  j-1,..  .12,
and  Et is an i.i.d.  error  term, Lt,  Wt.  and  Qt are  measured  in  natural
logarithms.  The above  model  was  estimated  by ordinary  least  squares  over  the
period  July  1975  to  June 1988.12  13  After  pruning  the  model  to eliminate10
parameters with absolute t-ratios less than unity (one  variable at a time),
the final estimates presented in Table 3 were obtained.  The within sample
predictiva performance of the model is good; the standard error of estimate is
less than 1% of the mean log attendance, and fitted ;alues track actual values
well (Figure 2).  The model passed all diagnostic tests performed (Table 3).
The parameter estimates indicate significant short-run elasticities of
EGS attendances with respect to foodgrain production and the real EGS wage
rate of -0.28 and 0.20 respectively.  The dynami: process of adjustment in
attendances to changing conditions is quite slow, as indicated  by the
coefficient on lagged attendances of 0.8.  Thus, the long-run elasticities for
output and the real wage are considerably higher than for the short-run; the
long-run elasticities are -1.4 and 1.0 respectively.  A negative time trend
in attendances is indicated, although it is quantitatively small, implying a
monthly rate of decline of (.07 percent (the latter cumulated over 13 years
would result in a fall by 10 percent).  Attendances also follow a highly
seasonal pattern, induced in part by the.  observed seasonali v  of raintall
(Table 3).
3.2  Tests for a Structural Break in the Model After .he  V-  Increase
The results of Table 3 suggest that, ceteris paribus, 'abor attendances
on EGS would have increased in response to the higher wage afLer mid-l988.
However, attendances actually declined sharply during the sagricult.lralu  year
1988/89 (Figure 2).  The average monthly attendance during 1988/89  'was barely
half of what it was during the previous year, which itself was not, by a long
shot, a peak EGS year.  An explanation may be sought in the higher than normal
rainfall during 1988/89 (also reflected in the foodgrains production for that11
year), resulting in greater availability of agricultural employment.  The
critical issue  here is  whether this explanation is sufficient to account for
the observed levels of attendance on EGS for this period.  Does the above
model  adequately  explain the decline in attendances after the wage increase,
taking account of the prevailing conditions?
We  performed two statistical tests of the accuracy of the model's
predictions in the post-sample period, July 1988 to June 1989.14 15  The first
involves estimating a new model for the entire (sample  and post-sample)
period, where the original model is augmented with a set of dummy variables,
one for each observation in the post-sample period, and then 1 testing for the
joint significance of the dummy variables (Pesaran  and Pesaran, 1987).  The
second test uses the ratio of the sum of squares of the one-step ahead
forecast errors to the variance of the regression error of the model as the
test sta-istic, which is distributed as Chi-square with degrees of freedom
given bv the !enit-h  of the forecast period (Granger  and Newbold, 1986).
The resul.s of the two tests are reported at the bottom of Table 3.
Thev,  both  indl'  c  i  iat  the null hypothesis of parameter stability is strongly
re,ec  ted  for  :he  pos -sample  period  July  1988  to  June  1989.  The  attendance
count  for  th c  l-f'  p,  ueriod  cannot  plausibly  have  been  generated  by  the  model
prevailing  prior  to the wage increase.16
3.3  An Estin.atke  of  the  Extent  of  Rationing  After  the  Wage  Increase
The drift ir.  the attendance  model  after the wage increase is
statisticaliv  significant.  We  shall now offer an assessment of its
quanti.ative importance.  We  shall  assume that the model we have estimated for
1975-88  satisfactorily represents the notional demand function for EGS work.12
This  could  be a strong  assumption,  for  there  may  well have  been some  rationing
in the  earlier  period  as well. 17 To the  extent  that  this  assumption  does  not
hold,  we will under-estimate  the  extent  of  rationing  in recent  years.
However,  the  results  we have  obtained  for  1975-88  are  at least  consistent  with
what  we would  expect  to find  for  a notional  demand  schedule  (and  quite  unlike
those  we  have obtained  for  recent  years,  as  we shall  discuss  later).
Under  this  assumption,  we can  use  the  1975-88  model  to estimaCe  the
latent  notional  demand  for  EGS  work in  the  12  months  after  the  wage increase.
This  can  then  be compared  to  actual  employment,  to estimate  the  extent  of
rationing  after  the  wage increase. Figure  2 gives  the  forecasted  attendance
counts  for the  post-sample  period. Note  that  these  are  dynamic  forecasts
using  the lagged  forecasts  (rather  than  lagged  actual  attendances).18  That is
appropriate,  since  we want to  know  what attendances  we would  have expected  if
there  had been  no rationing  in  the  post-sample  period.
The forecasts  indicate  a sharp  fall  in attendances  immediately  after
June 1988,  but not  as large  as that  actually  observed. Substantially  higher
attendances  are  predicted  by the  model,  and  the  deviation  between  forecast  and
actual  attendance  continues  to increase  well into  the  crop year.  Table  4
gives  the  estimated  employment  rationing  by month.
The  mean  predicted  attendance  for  the  post-sample  period  is  491,269  per
month.  The  mean  actual  attendance  was 212,840. We thus  estimate  that  almost
280,000  persons  per  month - about  3.3  million  for  the  whole  year - desired  EGS
employment  in 1988/89  but could  not  get  it.  The  amount  of rationing  increased
steadily  after  the  wage increase,  peaking  in  March  1989  (Table  4).
How  much of the  observed  decline  in  attendances  after  the  wage increase
is attributable  to this  rationing,  rather  than  other  factors,  such  as the  good13
monsoon  of that  year?  The  mean  monthly  attendance  at EGS in the  sample
period,  1975-88,  was 534,974  persons. The  decrease  in 1988/89  was thus
322,134,  of which  86%  is attributable  to rationing.
4.  Does  the  EGS  Nov  Guarantee  Emvlovment?
The  above  results  suggest  that  the  higher  minimum  wage  was associated
with a significant  change  in the  way employment  on EGS is  determined. We
shall  now return  to the  1987/90  period,  to see  if the  recent  data  are
consistent  with the  existence  of rationing. Two tests  will  be performed:  the
first  uses information  on  works in  progress,  while  the  second  uses information
on agricultural  wage rates. For  both,  we have a  data set  of a little  over 33
months,  though  14  months  are in  sub-period  1,  prior  to the  wage increase.
Rather  than  drop  this  period,  we have retained  the  full  33 observations.
Since  rationing  is less  likely  in  sub-period  1, its  inclusion  will probably
bias our  tests  toward  accepting  the  null  hypothesis  of  no rationing.
4.1  The  Effect  of the  Number  of  Works in  Progress  on Employment
Demand  for  EGS  work will  generally  depend  on the  wage schedule,  the  type
of  work available,  work-leisure  preferences,  other  wages  and  prices,  and
alternative  earning  opportunities.  However,  it  will also  depend  on the
accessibility  of the  available  work.  The  demand  for  work at a long  distance
from  home is  presumably  small,  and it  would  be unsurprising  to find  that  this
demand  is  easily  met  by the  scheme. Here  we shall  ask  whether  employment  is
available  to accommodate  the  notional  demand  for  local  employment,  for  which
travel  costs  (pecuniary  or non-pecuniary)  are  negligible. This is  consistent
with  the  sRirit  of EGS; since  its  inception,  the  scheme  has aimed  to  provide14
work within reasonable walking distance of home.  However, it may still be a
somewhat stronger form of "guarantee" than is intended by the govertument,  as
t"ie  legislation does not assure that travel costs will be negligible.
The motivation for our test can best be understood by noting that the
number of EGS projects should not affect the notional demand for local EGS
work, ceteris paribus.  If the scheme is truly successful in providing
guaranteed local employment, then the number of projects, and attendances at
the given projects, will adjust flexibly to accommodate the notional demand
for work.  An extra project, for example, would simply displace employment
elsewhere; the aggregate would remain unchanged, unless other conditions
facing  workers have changed.
The null.  hypothesis of guaranteed local employment can thus be
interpreted as the hypothesis that the observed monthly employment on EGS
equals the unobserved notional demand for EGS employment at zero travel cost.
It then follows that, under the null, L should not be influenced by the number
of EGS works in progress during the same month (denoted P).
The simplest testing procedure is as follows:  Regress Lt on Pt and on
other variables which, a priori, might be expected to influence Lt.  A
significant estimate of the coefficient on Pt implies rejection of the null,
subject to the usual caveat that the estimate be consistent.
We thus estimate the following test equation:
Lt  - bo  +  biLt-  1  t  b2Wt + b3WAt  + Mtk4' + b5Pt + ut  (2)
where Lt is observed person-days of employment on EGS for month t, Wt is the
average daily wage paid to laborers on EGS sites in that month, WAt is the15
reported  daily  wage in agriculture  for  month  t,  St is  a set  of monthly
dummies,  Pt is the  number  of works  in  progress  in  month  t,  and  ut  is  an i.i.d.
disturbance  term. 19 The lagged  dependent  variable  was included  to  preclude  a
spurious  estimate  of  bs as  a result  of serial  correlation  in  both the  L and P
series. One  would  generally  expect  that  the  notional  demand  for  EGS
employment  depends  positively  on W.  Since  agricultural  employment  is  an
alternative  to EGS  employment,  we would  expect  L to  depend  negatively  on WA
under  the  null.  And the  monthly  dummies  are included  to  capture  the  seasonal
nature  of agricultural  activity.
Since  April  1987,  EGS  authorities  have  been keeping  more  detailed
monthly  records  of employment,  wages  paid,  and  works  in  progress. Our
employment  data  after  April  1987  will  be estimates  of actual  person-days  of
employment,  rather  than  attendances,  as  were used in the  previous  section. At
the time  this  study  began,  these  data  were available  for  the  period  from
April,  1987 to  February,  1990.  For  the  period  up to December  1989  monthly
data  on agricultural  wage  rates  were also  available  from  the  Director  of
Economics  and  Statistics,  Government  of  Maharashtra. 20
OLS  estimates  of the  parameters  of interest  are  given  in  Column  1 of
Table  5.  The  estimated  coefficient  on P is  positive  and  significant. The
estimate  of the  coefficient  on  W is  significant,  but  does  not  have  the  sign
one  would  expect  of the  notional  demand  function  for  EGS  work.  The elasticity
w.r.t.  the  agricultural  wage rate  is not  significantly  different  from  zero.
While  these  results  are  suggestive  of rationing,  they  do not  warrant  an
immediate  rejection  of the  null. There  may  be sources  of bias in the  OLS
estimates  which  would invalidate  any  inference  based  on them.16
A necessary  condition  for  the  consistency  of OLS  estimates  is that  all
the  regressors  be exogenous. This includes  P.  Under  the  null,  exogeneity  of
P would  necessarily  imply  that  the  costs  of access  to EGS  projects  are
negligible. Only then  would  a full  accommodation  of the  demand  for  employment
in all  periods  be consistent  with  an exogenously  given  number  of projects.
This seems  unlikely. A more  plausible  assumption  is that  P is responsive  to
the  notional  demand  for  work in the  current  period  and  hence,  under  the  null,
to L.  Thus,  there  is  reason  to suspect  the  presence  of simultaneity  bias in
the  OLS estimates.
We correct  for  the  possible  bias  by instrumenting  for  Pt.  The  natural
instrument  is  Pt-,.  Possible  additional  instruments  are  the  lagged  values  of
L,  W,  and  WA.21 With these  instruments  for  Pt,  we obtained  the  IV estimates
given  in  Column  2  of Table  5.  Column  3 gives  the  slightly  more  precise
estimates  obtainable  by deleting  strongly  insignificant  variables  from
equation  (2). The  estimates  of  b5 are  again  highly  significant,  and  the
aforementioned  comments  on the  two  wage elasticities,  b2 and  b3, continue  to
hold.  Alternative  assumptions  about  the  partial  adjustment  process  governing
P might  suggest  somewhat  different  instruments.  While  the  use  of those
instruments  would  affect  the  efficiency  of the  estimates,  it  should  not  affect
their  consistency.
The  assumptions  we make  about  the  processes  generating  W and  WA will
also  be important. They  determine  the  status  of the  regressors  in (2),  which
in turn  dictates  the  appropriate  estimation  procedure. The  null  hypothesis
does  not, a  prior'.,  imply  any restrictions  on these  processes. So far  we have
implicitly  assumed  that  W and  WA are  exogenous. Relaxing  this  assumption,  we
estimated  (2)  instrumenting  for  Wt and  WAt  as well  as Pt i.e.,  these  variables17
were dropped  from  the  set  of instruments;  a dummy  variable  to  capture  the
doubling  of the  EGS  wage  was  added. Again,  the  IV  estimate  of the  coefficient
on Pt was  highly  significant  (with  similar  results  to  Table  5),  and the  wage
responses  remained  inconsistent  with  what  one  would  expect  of a notional
demand  function.
The  other  potential  source  of bias is the  possibility  of omitted
variables. The  problem  in this  instance  is somewhat  more  serious  than  in
most,  for  the  following  reason. Even if the  omitted  variables  are
uncorrelated  with the  remaining  included  variables,  given  the  endogeneity  of
Pt,  they  will  be correlated  with this  variable. A significant  estimate  of the
coefficient  on Pt may  therefore  simply  reflect  the influence  of these  omitted
variables. We have no  way of distinguishing  this  effect  from  that  which  would
arise  from  rationing.
Very little  can  be done  about  this  problem. We attempted  to mitigate
its  effects  by adding  to equation  (2)  various  potential  proximate  influences
on the  notional  demand  for  EGS  employment.  Among  the  variables  we included
were:  year  dummies,  the  deviations  in rainfall  from  the  mean,  monsoon  dummies,
and  various  interaction  terms. In each  case,  the  instrumental  variables
estimate  of the  coefficient  on Pt  was  highly  significant.
We cannot  eliminate  the  possibility  of omitted  variable  bias  and so  we
may  bc incorrectly  rejecting  the  null.  Nevertheless,  the  repeated  estimation,
under  different  procedures,  of different  variants  of the test  equation  failed
to yield  an insignificant  estimate  of b5, or anything  that  might  accord  with
our  intuition  about  the  determinants  of the  notional  demand  for  EGS
employment.18
Thus,  it is  hard  to believe  that  we are  observing  the  notional  demand
function  for  local  EGS  employment. The  opening  and  closing  of EGS  project
sites  gives  the  authorities  an effective  instrument  for influencing  EGS
employment  and,  hence,  budgetary  outlays,  independently  of the  need for  EGS
employment  by the  poor.
Unfortunately,  we cannot  repeat  this  test  for  any  reasonable  length  of
time  prior  to  May 1988,  as the  necessary  data  do not  exist. However,  given
that  we found  strong  evidence  in section  3  of a structural  break  in the  model
determining  EGS  attendances  after  that  date,  our  combined  results  are
consistent  with the  view that  rationing  was introduced  into  EGS  in response  to
the increase  in the  minimum  wage rate. The revealed  negative  wage elasticity
of employment  in  the  above  results,  in contrast  to the  expected  positive
response  found  in  the  previous  section,  is also  consistent  with this
interpretation.
Note  that  workers  need  not  have  been turned  away  from  existing  and  on-
going  sites  to  achieve  employment  rationing  on EGS. The  process  of opening
and  closing  works  allows  the  scheme  to influence  employment,  irrespective  of
notional  demand. For  example,  by closing  an existing  site,  the  authorities
will  generally  raise  the (pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary)  cost the  displaced
workers  incur  in  participating  in the  EGS.  The  way in  which  employment  is
rationed  across  workers  may thus  be quite  complex,  involving  the  various
factors  which  influence  effective  access  to  EGS  sites,  including,  for  example,
the  demands  on a worker's  time  at home.19
4.2  The Effect  on  Agricultural  Wazes.
A second  testable  implication  of -he  existence  of an effective
employment  guarantee  is that  one  would  expect  to see  a relationship  between
the  EGS  wage rate  and  the  agricultural  wage rate. The strength  of that
relationship  will depend  on specific  labor  market  conditions.  Many EGS
workers  are  also  regular  participants  in  the  agricultural  labor  market,  and
vice  versa.  Furthermore,  the  work  involved  appears  to  be quite  similar,  as
are  the  hours  worked.  In  these  circumstances,  with EGS  and  agricultural  wages
roughly  equal  initially,  higher  EGS  wages  with guaranteed  employment  would
have to result  in  higher  agricultural  wages.
A visual  inspection  of Figure  1 does  not suggest  that  the  agricultural
wage rate  responded  much to changes  in the  EGS  wage  rate  during  this  period.
Granted  the  simple  correlation  coefficient  between  the  two  wage rates  is  high
(r-.74). But  this  is la gely  a spurious  correlation,  reflecting  the  serial
correlation  of both seri.;;22  the  correlation  coefficient  is  only .32  between
the  innovations  in each  series  around  its  first  order  autoregression.  The
following  dynamic  regression  performs  fairly  well in  reproducing  the
agricultural  wage series  in Figure  1:
WAt  - 2.607  +  .675WAt  l  +  .134Wt  - .1l5W 1 +  monthly  dummy  variables
(1.95) (3.66)  (2.33)  (1.99)  and time  trend
R2-.851; SEE-.347;  Mean  d.v.-9.34;  n-31;  LM tests:  AR(l)-.41,
RESET-1.57,  NORM-l.19,  HETERO-2.22.
Within  the  current  month,  the  impact  on the  agricultural  wage rate  of a (say)
RplO increase  in the  EGS  wage  rate is  Rpl.3. This  is substantially  off-set  by20
the  negative  lagged  response;  by the  next  month  tne  total  im.pdct  falls  to
Rpl.2.
While  the  short-run  agricultural  wage response  is small,  one  might  still
conjecture  thal  there  is some  sort  of long-run  equilibrium  relationship
between  the  two  wage rates. Neither  Figure  I  nor  the  above  regression  offers
much support  for  that  conjecture.  The long-run  response  of the  agricultural
wage rate  to the  EGS  wage rate  implied  by the  above  regression  is  very  much
less  than  unity;  a  RplO increase  in the  EGS  wage  rate  would  result  in less
than  Rpl increase  in the  agricultural  wage in  the  long-run. The  existence  of
a long-run  equilibrium  wage  differential  can  also  be assessed  by testing  for
cointegration,  using  the  methodology  proposed  by Engle  and  Granger  (1987).
The  wage  ser,es  in Figure  1 fail  the  cointegration  test;  the  null  hypothesis
of no cointegration  cannot  be convincingly  rejected  with these  data.23
Possibly  the  number  of available  observations  is inadequate  for
detecting  the  true  long-run  response;  the  power  of these  tests  is  questionable
in  small  samples. Nonetheless,  the  lack  of an appreciable  short-run  or long-
run impact  on agricultural  wage rates  casts  doubt  on any  presumption  that  the
"guarantee"  has provided  a secure  fall-back  position  for  agricultural  workers.
Indirect  transfer  benefits  to the  poor from  the  second-round  effects  of public
employment  on agricultural  labor  markets  are  potentially  large  (Ravallion,
1990a,c). But  these  data  do not  suggest  that  the  potential  has  been  realized
by the  EGS,  at least  over  recent  years.21
5.  Concluslion
Increasing  the  statutory  minimum  wage rate  can  seem  an attractive  policy
for  politicians  keen to  enhance  their  popularity  amongst  the  poor.  Political
pressure  for  an increase  in  the  minimum  agricultural  wage rate  in  Maharashtra
led  to its  doubling  in mid-1988. Subsequently,  there  has  been concern  in
government  circles  and  the  development  community  about  the  consequences  for
the  state's  famous  "Employment  Guarantee  Scheme". The  view  one takes  of the
Maharashtra  experience  also  has implications  for  the  design  of other  schemes
of this  sort,  such  as the  proposed  national  EGS.
Historically,  statutory  minimum  wage rates  in rural  areas  have  been
virtually  impossible  to enforce,  and the  agricultural  wage rate  has often  been
belcw  the  minimum  wage rate.  In theory  at least,  EGS  gives  the  government  a
policy  instrument  for  enforcing  a minimum  wage  rate,  as the  guarantee  should
be a credible  threat  in the  labor  market. However,  unless  the  politicians  are
also  willing  to foot  the  bill,  the  need for  budgetary  rastraint  will  create
pressure  for  a relaxation  of the  "guarantee".  If so, the  poverty  alleviation
impact  of an increase  in the  minimum  wage  ea.e  may  be quickly  dissipated;  some
will  get  higher  wages,  but  others  will  have to go without. Under  these
circumstances,  it is  quite  possible  for  poverty  - by any  reasonable  measure  -
to increase  after  the  imposition  of a  higher  wage rate  for  relief  work
(Ravallion,  1990a).
Our comparison  of the  budgetary  aggregates  and related  statistics  on EGS
reveals  that  average  monthly  expenditures  actually  fell  after  the  increase  in
the  statutory  minimum  wage rate. This is  attributable  to two  main factors:
i)  After  an initial  adjustment  period  of a few  months,  we find  that  the
real  average  EGS  wage rate  increased  by only  one-third,  despite  the  initial22
doubling  of all  nominal  piece  rates. Inflation  helped  (and  it  will  continue
to do so).  However,  the  more important  factor  was that  the  available  work  on
EGS  shifted  toward  activities  which  are  paid  at lower  piece  rates. This
allowed  considerable  "buffering"  of the  average  EGS  wage rate  from  the
doubling  in the  piece  rate  schedule.
ii)  There  was a sharp  fall  in  EGS  employment  after  the  increase  in  wage
rates. Employment  fell  by about  one-third. However,  this  alone  does  not
imply  that  the  authorities  introduced  rationing. There  are  other  variables  to
consider. The two  crop-years  after  the  wage increase  were  good for
agriculture,  thanks  to  excellent  and timely  monsoons,  particularly  in  1988/89.
The  comparison  of aggregate  statistics  on EGS  before  and  after  mid-1988
is thus  consistent  with  rationing,  but it is  not convincing  evidence. Only  by
careful  modelling  of the  determination  of employment  on EGS  can  we hope to
answer  the  question  of whether  or not  the  imposition  of  higher  minimum  wage
rates  led to  a significant  and  substantial  change  in the  scheme,  whereby  an
unfulfilled  demand  for  relief  work emerged  on a large  scale.
Our  econometric  investigations  suggest  that  this  is  what  happened. We
have presented  three  empirical  observations  to support  that  conclusion;
i)  A model  of EGS  employment  (measured  by an attendance  count)  was
estimated  on monthly  data  over  13  years  prior  to the  doubling  of the  minimum
wage rate  in  mid-1988. The  model  behaves  pretty  much  as one  would  expect  over
this  period;  EGS  attendances  respond  positively  to the  EGS  wage rate,
negatively  to foodgrain  output,  and  have the  expected  response  to unusual
rainfall  patterns  ar.d  the  normal  seasonality  of agricultural  operations.
However,  this  changes  markedly  after  mid-1988. The  model  predicts
substantially  higher  EGS  attendances  than  those  actually  observed  after  the23
increase  in the  minimum  wage  rate,  and  allowing  for  the  fact  that  1988/89  was
a good  ab,ricultural  year.  Our  results  suggest  a structural  break  in the
process  of employment  determination,  consistent  with the introduction  of
rationing. Assuming  that  our  model  adequately  captures  the  notional  demand
function  for  EGS  work,  we estimate  that  the  EGR  met only  43% of that  demand  in
the  12  months  after  the  wage increase. 86%  of the  difference  between  mean
employment  per  month  in 1988/89  and  that  for  the  preceding  13  years  was due  to
rationing;  otherwise  we  would  have  expected  to see  an attendance  figure  some
3.3  million  persons  higher  in  1988/89. We do  not  know  whether  there  was  any
systematic  pattern  in the  rationing  (whether,  for  example,  it tended  to  be the
poorest  participants).  An investigation  of the  spatial  pattern  of rationing
across  districts  may throw  light  on this  question.
ii)  A further  test  is  possil..e  for  a three  year  period  up to  early  1990
for  which  we  have  better  employ-f,ent  data  and  a monthly  series  on the  number  of
EGS  works in  progress. For  this  recent  period,  we find  little  evidence  to
suggest  that  the  observed  series  of EGS  employment  can  be interpreted  as the
workers'  notional  demand  for  local  work  on the  scheme. The  number  of works  in
progress  has  a sizable  and  significant  effect  on EGS  employment,  which  is  not
what one  would  expect  if  the  scheme  was  simply  accommodating  the  notional
demand  for  local  EGS  employment.  Also,  unlike  the  period  prior  to the
increase  in  minimum  wage rates,  we find  a seemingly  perverse  response  of
emplovment  to EGS  wage rates. And  agricultural  wage  rates  do not  appear  to
have influenced  employment  on EGS in  recent  years.
iii)  Finally,  we investigated  the  effect  on agricultural  labor  markets.
If EGS  really  was absorbing  the  excess  supply  of labor  to  alternative  work
then  one  would  expect  to  see  a substantial  impact  on  wages  for  that  work24
stemming  from  shifts  in EGS  wages. However,  we find  no sign  of an equilibrium
relationship  between  the  two  wage rates. Little  more than  lCX  of an increase
in  the  EGS  wage  was  passed  on in the  agricultural  wage rate in  either  the
short-run  or long-run. Rationing  of EGS  emplovment  appears  to have  dampened
the  expected  second-round  income  effects  arising  through  agricultural  labor
markets.
Whether  one  deems  these  changes  to  have  been  desirable  or not  depends
crucially  on one's  judgement  of the  desirability  of an employment  guaiantee.
The  concept  of assured  employment,  albeit  at a low  wage,  does  have  a number  of
potentially  attractive  features  from  the  po'nt  of view  of poverty  alleviation:
it  generally  allows  scarce  resources  to  go to the  poorest  first  (at  least
those  able  to  work),  it  maximizes  the  insurance  benefits  to the  poor,  and it
helps  undermine  some  of the  possibilities  for  their  corruption  on such
schemes,  and  for  their  exploitation  in labor  ;irkets  and  tenancy  contracts.
However,  achieving  these  benefits  with limited  budgetary  resources  must  entail
a sufficiently  low  wage rate. There  can  be no presumption  that  higher  wage
rates  without  the  necessary  budgetary  resources  will  be in  the interests  of
the  poor.25
Notes
1.  There is  a large literature  on the  sc-heme,  including  Acharya and Panwalkar
(1988), Basu (1981), Bhende et al.,  (1990), Dandekar and Sathe (1980), Dreze
(1990),  Echeverri-Gerit  (1988),  Herring  and Edwards (1983),  and Lieberman (1985).
More general discussions of the economics of this type of policy can be found
in Besley and Coate  (1990), Dreze and Sen  (1990), Narayana  et al.,  (1988),
Ravallion (1990b), and World Bank (1990, Chapter 6).
2.  The existing evidence is  more conclusive on porformance in screening poor
from  non-poor, than  on transfer  and stabilization  benefits, recognizing that the
latter  are net of participants' forgone incomes,  whicn are difficult to  measure.
See Ravallion  (1990b) for a  recent survey of  the evidence  on  the scheme's
performance in poverty alleviation.
3.  Exceptions can arise if  non-wage cost per worker is sufficiently  high, or
if  a high value is  placed on  participants crossing the  poverty line (rather  than
raising the lowest incomes).  Ravallion (1990a) examines the theoretical case
for and against wide coverage in a poverty alleviation scheme.
4.  A Times of India News Service report from Pune, October 18, 1988, stated
that:  "Slums mushrooming on  the periphery of  several towns  in Maharashtra's
sugar belt  indicate the large scale migration of landless laborers from the
drought-hit areas in search of livelihood.  The migration does not appear to  be
seasonal like the earlier ones, with the result that the slums may well develop
into permanent settlements."  The report identifies failure to find EGS work as
the main cause.
5.  Prior to this period, only limited data are available on a monthly basis.
From  April 1987,  computerized records  have  been kept  of person-days  of employment
and other variables, such as works in progress.  Prior to this date, only an
attendance count is available on a monthly basis.  There were clear errors in
a few observations,  usually  under-reported employment evident  as extreme average
wage  rates;  15 of  the 875 district/month observations  in  the data  set  (25
districts bv 35  months) had to  be deleted for this reason.  Our aggregate series
on EGS were built up from the district data, deleting these obvious errors.
6.  For example, suppose (to simplify the exposition) that there  are just two
activities, "digging" and "shifting",  with the rate for digging set above that
for shifting.  The relative wage is fixed (it did not change before and after
May 1988), and we shall assume that the administrator cannot influence total
employment.  The value of output is f(s,l-s)  per unit of total employment,  where
s  denotes the  proportion of labor  allocated to shifting  which is  paid at the  rate
W.  (The production function is quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree one.)
The surplus per unit of employment is then
f(s,l-s)-[s+(l-s)r]W
where  r >  1 denotes the wage relativity  (digging/shifting).  The surplus  is
maximized when the difference in marginal,  social products between shifting and26
digging  is  equal  to the  difference  in  wage rates,  f,-fl_,  - (l-r)W,  and it is
readily  verified  that  the  surplus  maximizing  value  of  s is  a strictly  increasing
function  of W.
7.  This  is  also  observed  between  sub-perioos  I and  2, though  this  may  partly
reflect  seasonality;  we shall  model  seasonality  explicitly  in the  next  section.
8.  From April 1987 to February 1990 the two variables are very highly
correlated  (r-.996  in levels,  .989  in logs).
9.  Data  on labor  attendance  on EGS  and  the  EGS  time  wage were  obtained  from
the  Planning  Department,  Government  of  Maharashtra.
10.  Foodgrain output data disaggregated  by kharif and rabi seasons are
available  only up to 1987-88. Since  we are  particularly  interested  in seeing
how the  model  predicts  labor  attendances  after  mid-1988,  we are unable  to use
the  seasonally  disaggregated  data  on foodgrain  output.
11.  Ideally,  we would  also like to include  variables  for the non-foodgrain
output. We  are  however  constrained  by the  non-availability  of  data  for  the  last
two tears  of  our  sample  period. Foodgrains  nevertheless  still  account  for  about
70  per  cent  of the  gross  cropped  area in  Maharashtra  (GOM  1987,  1989).
12.  The fact  that  we do not  have  a monthly  series  on the  EGS  wage rate  means
that  there  is  measurement  error  in  this  variable,  which  will  bias  OLS  estimates.
We also  estimated  a generalized  instrumental  variables  estimator,  in  which the
EGS  wage  was  not  used  as  its  own  instrument.  The  instrumental  variables  included
the  average  EGS  wage  rate  of  the  previous  year  and  the  rank  of  the  current  year's
EGS  wage,  as  well  as  all  other  RHS  variables.  The  IV  estimator  gave  very  similar
results  to  Table 3, though  with a slightly  lower  wage elasticity  (0.15  rather
than  0.20).  In  view of this,  and the  fact that  we gain 11 degrees  of freedom
using  the  OLS  estimator,  we decided  to stay  with  the latter.
13.  The model  parameters  also contain  a dummy  variable  for  December  1977.
We  believe  there  is  an  error  in  the  data  for  this  month. Excluding  that  variable
had little  effect  on other parameters,  though  it did yield significant  non-
normality  of residuals,  as indicated  by the  LM test.
14.  As evident  in  Figure  1,  the  actual  increase  in  the  wage  rate  was  staggered
over  June to September  1988,  so starting  the  post-sample  forecasting  in July
(rather  than  June)  is  reasonable.  This  also  coincides  with  the  beginning  of  the
new  crop-year.
15.  1988 was not, of course, the first instance  when piece rates on EGS
increased,  though  it  was the  largest  increase. However,  in the  earlier  cases
we do not find any evidence  of structural  instability,  as indicated  by the
evolution  of recursive  residuals  since December  1978.  Both the CUMSUM  and
CUMSUMSQ  statistics  (Brown  et al., 1975)  are well within the 95% confidence
intervals.27
16.  We also estimated the following model over the entire period, so as to
focus on any possible changes in the attendance-wage relationship in the post-
sample period:
Lt - 4.73 +  0.8l0lLt l - 0.2715Qt +  0.1866(1-DPSt)Wt +  0.0816DPSt.Wt
(4.458)  (22.14)  (2.786)  (2.178)  (0.973)
- 0.00066t +  other terms as in equation (1)
(1.476)
R2-0.95; SEE-0.1115; Mean d.v.-13.0571; N-167
LK tests: AR(12)-0.704; RESET(l)-5.66; HETERO(l)-2.84; NORM(2)-l.273
where DPS is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the post-sample period,
and 0 otherwise.  Thus, a significant  positive relationship  between attendances
and the EGS wage tends to vanish in the post-sample period.  This disappearance
of the attendance-wage relation for a period when  the wage  itself increased
appreciably is suggestive of there  being some rationing of EGS employment.
17.  For example, even in normal times it  has been said that the scheme is less
effective in reaching poor tribals in some districts, such as Thane.
18.  Two types of forecasts can be made: (i) static ("one-step") forecasts,
which are made one month ahead, and so are based on the actual values of the
previous month's attendance count, as well as the observed current values of
all other  variables in  the post-sample  period, and (ii)  dynamic forecasts,  which
do not assume that any attendance counts are known for the post-sample period;
unlike static forecasts, they use the forecasted  values of the previous month's
attendances.  The forecasts in  Figure 2  are  dynamic forecasts.  These  are our  best
estimates of the time series of attendances that one would have observed in the
post-sample period if there had not been any change in the model determining
employment.  Unlike static forecasts, dynamic forecasts do not "build in" the
effects  of any employment rationing since the increase in the minimum  wage rate.
19.  All variables except the monthly dummies are in natural logs.  The wages
are in real terms.  The consumer price index for agricultural laborers was used
to deflate the nominal wages.  The base date is April 1987.
20.  These  data  are  unpublished.  They  are  available  in  the  form  of  a
fortnightly series of daily wages by gender for  various agricultural operations
for each  of  75 monitoring  points  spread  over  rural Maharashtra.  For  our
purposes, we have used the simple mean of all wage  *servations available for
a given month as the estimate of the average wage r>,e for Maharashtra in that
month.
21.  The  choice  of  these  instruments  can  be  justified  within  a  partial
adjustment framework (or error correction model) expressing the actual number
of projects as a suitable function of its own lagged value and the current and
lagged values  of the desired number of projects, and where  the latter  is a
function of the expected and unexpected components of the notional demand for
EGS employment.28
22.  The  Durbin-Watson  test  on the  OLS  residuals  from  the  static  regression  of
real  agricultural  wage rate  against  real  EGS  wage rate  is .86.
23.  The  Engle-Granger  methodology  involves  first  testing  for  unit  roots  in  each
series,  and  then (if  unit roots  are  indicated)  testing  for  stationarity  in  the
OLS  residuals  from  the  "static"  regression  in  the  levels  of the  two  series. We
used  the  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests  proposed  by  Engle  and  Cranger.  Unit  roots
were indicated  in both the EGS and agricultural  wage series.  The first
difference  of  the  residuals  from  the  static  regression  was  then  regressed  against
its own lagged  values (first  and second  order),  and the lagged  level  of the
residual. The t-ratio  on the  latter  was  1.06,  which  is  well  below  the  critical
value  (for  larger  sample  sizes)  given  in  Engle  and  Granger  (1987). The  test  was
repeated  using  nominal  wage  rates,  and  with  both real  and  nominal,  wage  rates  in
log  form.  In  no case  could  the  null  of no cointegration  be rejected  (t-ratios
were  all  similar  to  the  above  figure). While  it is  recognized  that  these  tests
can  lack  power  in  small  samples,  the  rejection  of  cointegration  would  still  seem
convincing.29
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Table  1: Summary  Data  on EGS  Before  and  After  the  Wage  Increase.
Sub-period:
1  2  3  Percentage
April  87-  June  88-  December  88-  change
May 88  November  88  February  90  1 to 3
Total  cost  132.6  123.6  105.3  -21
(RpxlO 6/month,
April  1987  prices)
Of which:
Wage  cost  88.7  91.0  76.0  -14
Non-wage  cost  43.9  32.6  29.2  -33
Employment
(Person-daysxlO 6/month)  9.9  6.5  6.1  -38
Average  wage  rate  9.0  15.1  12.4  37
(Rp/day,  April  1987
prices).
Average  non-wage  cost  4.6  5.9  4.9  7
per  worker  (Rp/day,
April  1987  prices)32
Table  2.  A Decomposition  of  the  Change  in  Operating  Cost.
Change  in average  monthly  cost  due to:
(3)-ml)klLl/pl  increase  in  minimum  nominal  wage rate  89.0
+(P 3-pl)alklLl/pl 2 increase  in price  level  -17.8
+(k 3.kl)m1L1/pl  change  in  work composition  -37.9
+(X 3-X 1)LI  change  in real  unit  non-wage  cost  2.6
+(L 3-LI)V 1 change  in employment  -51.8
residual  (interaction  effects)  -11.5
-C3-C 1 change  in  real  cost  -27.3
(RpxlO6/month,  April  1987  prices)33
Table  3: Parameter  Estimates  for  the  EGS  Monthly  Attendance  Model,  1975-88
Explanatory  Parameter  estimate











Month  Mj  REi  RDi
July  -0.116  -0.758  -0.572
(1.74)  (1.86)  (1.41)








December  0.376  -0.075  -0.182
(5.39)  (1.57)  (2.01)
January  0.106  0.069  0.085
(1.77)  (1.13)  (1.02)
February  0.063  0.226
(2.01)  (3.96)








R2-0.923; SEE-0.1096; Mean d.v.-13.1286; N-155; Durbin h-0.445;









July  1988  248.1  70.6
August  1988  147.7  151.7
September  1988  97.5  163.7
October  1988  79.3  168.4
November  1988  85.1  188.2
December  1988  130.1  283.2
January  1989  182.1  327.2
February  1990  238.9  385.0
March  1990  308.9  461.3
April  1990  342.5  401.6
May 1990  371.3  382.7
June 1990  322.5  357.7
Mean 1988/89  212.8  278.435
Table  5: Further  Tests  for  Employment  Rationing  1987-9.
Estimation  method
Elasticity  of EGS  1  2  3
employment  w.r.t.:  (OLS)  (IV)  (IV)
The  number  of works  b5 1.094  1.243  1.136
in  progress  (P)  (3.83)  (3.08)  (4.85)
The  average  EGS  b2 -.514  -. 523  -. 479
wage  rate (W)  (2.30)  (2.32)  (2.92)
The  average  ag.  b3 -. 011  .102  n.a.
wage rate (WA)  (.017)  (.144)
Note:  Absolute  t-ratios  in  parentheses,  31  monthly  observations,  R2-.97 for
1,2  and  3. Regressions  1  and  2 included  11  monthly  dummy  variables  and  lagged
dependent  variable. Regression  3 excludes  highly  insignificant  variables
(including  agricultural  wage rate). All regressions  passed  LK tests  for
serial  correlation,  functional  form,  normality,  and  heteroscedasticity.  See
text  for  further  details  on the  model.36
Figure 1: EGS and Agricultural  Wage Rates
Rupees per day, April 1987 prices
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Figure 2: EGS Attendances  by  Month
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